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INTRODUCTION 
In 1863, when the (English) Football Association was founded, individuals 
who fell bankrupt were still sent to a debtors’ prison, a situation which 
continued until they were finally closed in 1867.  The ambient social 
attitude then was that insolvency was a matter not merely of shame, but 
of criminal conduct. 
By the first decade of the twenty-first century, approximately 140 years 
later, attitudes had changed dramatically.  While few English football 
clubs had become insolvent in the professional era, beginning in 1885, 
the move into commercialisation and the post-commercialised era 
resulted in insolvency becoming, while not quite the norm, at least a far 
from unusual situation. 
A brief ‘pre-research’ scoping exercise identified very few clubs who had 
faced insolvency during the major part of the professionalised era.  These 
few examples of insolvency or near-insolvency include, in England: 
Accrington Stanley (resigned from the League 1962); 
Gateshead (not re-elected 1960; disbanded 1973); 
Bradford Park Avenue (not re-elected 1970; disbanded 1974); 
Portsmouth (1976; rescued by ‘SOS Pompey’); 
Charlton (1984; club, but not stadium, acquired by fans); 
and in Scotland: 
Third Lanark (1967; declared bankrupt and liquidated following a 
Board of Trade enquiry). 
In the commercialised era, however, insolvency began to feature all too 
commonly. 
The pre-research exercise has been reported as Beech (2007).  This 
Working Paper reports on further progress to date on a major research 
project to investigate this perhaps surprising development. 
 
THE LITERATURE CONTEXT 
It was not until Argenti (1976) that a thorough analytical study of 
business failure was made.  He highlighted the importance of 
distinguishing between the causes of failure and the symptoms of failure.  
This present research project acknowledges that its focus is on the 
symptoms of failure, and that any causal relationship between symptom 
and cause will be, at best, tentative. 
The project also draws to some extent on the approach supported by 
Anheier and Moulton, who argue that there are distinct approaches to the 
study of failure: organisational, political, cognitive, and structural 
(Anheier and Moulton, 1999a and b).  This work in the football sector, 
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however, suggests that in this particular sector the approaches are less 
distinct, and are in fact inter-related.  Anheier and Moulton further 
suggest that there are four aspects of failure to be explored: concept, 
cause, process, and implications. 
Because it involves a specific legal process, bankruptcy, which in the 
context of this study includes the liquidation of incorporated bodies, is the 
most studied form of failure and many studies have explored organisations 
in this category.  Related terms are ‘insolvency’, which is best thought of  
as bankruptcy without the legal process that pushes an organisation over 
the edge, and ‘financial distress’, but these states are not sufficiently clear-
cut to be easily researched; indeed such states are normally concealed as 
far as possible.  Because we are conducting a qualitative study and are 
particularly interested in behaviour at the margins, we are going to use 
these words precisely and as follows: 
• Bankrupt/in liquidation – the situation where by due legal process 
control of an organisation has passed from its directors to an outside 
independent party, normally known as an administrator or receiver, 
who acts in the interests of the creditors. 
• Insolvent – unable to meet your obligations as they fall due.  The 
most high-profile recent UK insolvency was the Channel Tunnel.  The 
creditor banks were owed billions of pounds but it suited them to 
influence the directors rather than to appoint a receiver and, 
indirectly, to receive ownership of a hole in the ground. 
• Financially distressed/illiquid – short of money.  By its nature these 
are  not precise terms. 
• Liquid – with surplus cash, for example after a small club sells a star 
player or has an unexpected cup run. 
Authors have tended to try and associate the bankruptcy with the study of 
a particular business facet, such as cash-based fund flows (Aziz, Emanuel 
and Lawson, 1988), agency and prospect theory (D’Aveni, 1989a and b), 
governance structures (Daily and Dalton, 1994), inter-organisational 
linkages and financial leverage (Sheppard, 1994) and a variety of factors 
(Daily, 1994). 
The prediction of bankruptcy through the use of financial data has 
prompted considerable research.  Altman developed a model which 
offered a reasonable degree of success in predicting bankruptcy two to 
three years ahead of the event (Altman, 1968).  This model was refined 
and adapted for use in the United Kingdom by Taffler and Tisshaw.  
Among the examples which they said would have been predictable with 
their model was the 1973 collapse of Court Line (Taffler and Tisshaw, 
1977).  Altman further developed his predictive model (Altman, 
Haldeman and Narayan, 1977), and it has been further developed more 
recently by Zopounidis and Dimitras (1998). 
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Morris casts doubts, however, on the accuracy of such models, because of 
the high rate of misclassification error, their self-fulfilling nature, and the 
fact that many bankruptcies are due to ‘unforeseeable’ circumstances 
(Morris, 1998). 
The particular nature of sport as business – exemplified in the Commission 
of the European Communities’ White Paper on Sport (2007), which argues 
that there is a ‘specificity’ to sport – suggests that general theoretical 
frameworks may be problematic in their application to sport as business.  
The argument that individual sectors need individual ‘recipes’ has been well 
rehearsed by Spender (1989; 1998), and an objective of this project is to 
produce an individual analysis of insolvency – individual in that it is 
recognised from the outset that it is highly unlikely that it will be 
generalisable beyond the sports industry.  
Within the football sector, interest in the performance nexus – on the pitch 
and in financial terms – grew as the post-commercialised phase of 
business evolution emerged following the formation of the Premier League 
and the first BSkyB broadcasting rights contract (Beech, 2004).  Within a 
decade there was an extensive literature – see, for example, Conn (1997), 
Szymanski and Kuypers (1999), Hamil et al. (1999), Morrow (1999) and 
Hamil et al. (2000) – but the emphasis in writings was on the general, on 
success or on lack of success.  Two more recent examples from the 
literature do focus on failure: Buraimo et al. (2006) and Emery and Weed 
(2006).  They are of particular interest in that they adopt strongly different 
approaches.  While Buraimo et al. concentrate on the analysis of 
aggregated financial data with relatively little consideration of individual 
clubs, and are thus entirely quantitative, Emery and Weed begin from this 
perspective but then focus on a single case study (of Lincoln City), 
considering both the financial failure and the subsequent recovery.  While 
both these contrasting approaches are attractive and insightful, it is clear 
that a methodology covering both aggregated and individual data, and 
quantitative and qualitative data, is likely to give the richest analysis. 
 
OUTLINE OF THE INTENDED METHODOLOGY 
A three-phase methodology has been developed.  In brief, the three 
phases envisaged were: 
1. An exploratory phase to define the scope of the project.  This 
included identifying the temporal scope – the date from which 
the study should begin – and the spatial scope – in particular, 
whether to look at football in Britain or just in England.  Once the 
temporal scope had been identified, a timeline of relevant 
external events was to be developed. 
2. A phase of data gathering and analysis covering the selected 
phase. 
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Data gathering consisted of identifying all instances of insolvency 
during the chosen period, building mini-case studies of each 
instance, identifying the factors which proved relevant in each 
case, mapping the data gathered together with any further data 
identified as being needed to meet the needs of the 
investigation, and mapping this data into a database.  The 
structure of the database would be such that it could be sorted in 
ways that would lead to the identification of archetypes1 of clubs 
that became insolvent.  
3. In a third phase, each archetype would lead to specific clubs to 
be identified for deeper investigation involving interviews with 
key players in individual insolvencies. 
 
PHASE ONE 
As the detailed scoping exercise began, a number of issues arose which 
needed to be addressed.  Prime among these was the issue of the 
reliability of secondary and tertiary data.  In particular it emerged that the 
normal research method of triangulation to confirm the accuracy of data 
was problematic as secondary and tertiary data sources on the internet 
were tending to be the same in terms of the original (and usually 
uncited) source.   
The most obvious starting point was the well known series of annual 
Deloitte Touche Reports. While these Reports provided a useful check-list 
of clubs becoming insolvent, they only cover English League clubs and 
would have pre-defined the time range.  It was therefore decided to build 
from scratch a list of clubs with dates at which they went into 
Administration. 
In order to do this, the BBC News website was selected as a source to 
trawl using the search function.  This posed problems in that the earliest 
available pages were from 1999.  A comprehensive trawl was therefore 
made of these websites: 
Wikipedia 
The Political Economy of Sport - Clubs 
Clubs In Crisis 
For promotions and relegations, Football Club History Database  
Where appropriate, individual Supporters’ Trust websites 
                                                 
1  The term ‘archetype’ has been chosen over ‘ideal model’ or ‘exemplar’ in order to 
avoid a positive conotation. 
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with data being logged onto an Excel spreadsheet under the following 
headings: 
When the club went into Administration 
Which tier the club was in at the time 
The club’s recent previous (at least three years’) performance 
Size of the club’s debts 
The club’s creditors 
The business model in use by the club 
The club’s catchment area / local competition 
The club’s owner / directors 
Any criminal activity (alleged/proven) by the club’s owner / 
directors 
Stadium factors (ownership; development; move; rental) 
The club’s rescuer (or not) 
Data was thus partly quantitative and partly qualitative.  The use of 
coding allowed the spreadsheet to be sorted by qualitative data as well as 
quantitative data. 
The basis for logging a club’s insolvency is not as clear-cut as might be 
imagined, and the basis for logging is discussed in the Appendix. 
Scope 
Once data had been gathered under the first four headings, three 
decisions were made regarding the scope of the project: 
1. It was decided to restrict further research to clubs which play within 
the English League system 
2. As some clubs seem to have gone into ‘free-fall’ once they have 
been relegated from Tier 4 (the current League Division 2), it was 
decided to cover all Tiers of English football.  Although this means 
including a small number of Tier 5 and Tier 6 clubs, relatively few 
clubs below this level were found as being reported in 
Administration.  While it is possible that low-tier clubs do fall into 
Administration but are not widely reported as doing so, it seems 
more likely that at the lower levels there are lower levels of budget, 
lower levels of debt and lower levels of uncertainty, resulting in 
higher levels of stability, increased ease of financial control and the 
increased probability of finding a benefactor, who would, in effect, 
underwrite the club’s losses.  
3. 1986 was selected as the starting point for the study as before that 
date there were relatively few cases of insolvency, as reported 
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above. In addition, 1986 saw a significant change in the law on 
insolvency. 
 
Timeline 
The following key events were identified as constituting a timeline against 
which data should be evaluated: 
1986 Insolvency Act (introduced the notion of ‘wrongful 
trading’) 
1992 Premiership formed as Tier 1, with major 
broadcasting rights contract awarded to BSkyB 
1997 Premiership introduce ‘parachute payments’ for clubs 
relegated to Tier 2 
27 Mar 2002 ITV Digital, then owners of Football League 
broadcasting rights, collapsed 
2002 Enterprise Act passed but not immediately brought 
into use 
15 Sep 2003 Crown loses ‘preferential creditor’ status 
25 Sep 2003 Football League introduces ‘parachute payments’ for 
clubs relegated from Tiers 2 and 3 
1 Apr 2004 Insolvency provisions of Enterprise Act 2002 come 
into force 
16 Apr 2005 Internal Revenue (IR) and Customs & Excise (C&E) 
merge to form Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
(HMRC) 
22 Jul 2007 Premier League offers Football League ‘solidarity 
package’ to ensure a fairer distribution of revenues 
across the professional English game 
 
 
INITIAL FINDINGS 
In the light of the difficulty of obtaining data on cases of insolvency as far 
back as 1986, the datasets are not yet fully complete in their detail, 
although the authors are confident that the list of insolvencies is 
complete.  However, as Figure 1 shows, it is the older incidents that are 
much less common, and there is sufficient data to present initial findings. 
To date (June 2008), in the period beginning in 1986 a total of 56 clubs in 
the English leagues have been identified as becoming insolvent.  Three of 
these are Welsh clubs which play in English leagues – Newport County, 
Swansea City and Wrexham. 
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Allowing for clubs becoming insolvent more than once and clubs 
regressing into deeper states of insolvency (see Appendix), a total of 68 
incidents of insolvency have been identified. 
 
Figure 1 Incidence of insolvency by calendar year since 1986 
At the time of entering insolvency the clubs were distributed across the 
league tiers as follows: 
 Tier 1   0 clubs 
 Tier 2 13 clubs 
 Tier 3 16 clubs 
 Tier 4 19 clubs 
 Tier 5 10 clubs 
 Tier 6   6 clubs 
 Tier 7   0 clubs 
 Lower than Tier 8   1 club 
In the case of two further clubs, the year only of the insolvency has been 
identified, meaning that, because of promotion or relegation, the tier at 
the time of the insolvency has not yet been identified; in one case it must 
be either Tier 3 or Tier 4; in the other, it is either Tier 4 or Tier 5. 
Although no Tier 1 club has become insolvent, a pattern of a club being 
relegated from the top Tier and very shortly becoming insolvent can be 
identified with such frequency that we feel confident in labelling it as one 
of our archetypes.  Such clubs are shown in Table 1.  
The peak of insolvencies in 2002 would seem to lend credence to the 
received wisdom that the collapse of ITV Digital was the major causal 
factor of these clubs’ insolvency, as does the fact that all three clubs 
relegated from the Premier League in 2002 found themselves insolvent 
very shortly.  This collapse occurred towards the end of the 2001/02 
season (27 March 2002) and the data was re-plotted on a season by 
season basis to see if this produced a significantly different peak at this 
apparently crucial time.  The results are shown in Figure 2. 
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Club Relegated Administration in season start Debts 
Middlesbrough 1982 1985 £2m 
Crystal Palace 1998 1998 £9m 
QPR 1996 2000 £13m 
Bradford City 2001 2001 £33m 
Leicester City 2002 2002 £40m 
Ipswich Town 2002 2002 £35m 
Wimbledon FC 2000 2002 £20m 
Derby County 2002 2003 £33m 
Leeds United 2004 2006 £35m 
Table 1 Tier 1 clubs which subsequently became insolvent 
 
Figure 2 Incidence of insolvency by season since 1986/87 
This re-plotting of the data would suggest that, while the collapse of ITV 
Digital was a significant factor in causing clubs to become insolvent, it 
acted as a catalyst in a number of cases rather than being the primary 
cause – the incidence of insolvency was already on the rise.  Plotting the 
data this way would also suggest that the incidence of insolvency is 
currently on the rise.  
Any relegation seems to be a common circumstance for insolvency.  In 
30% of instances the club had been relegated in the previous 12 months, 
36% in the previous 24 months and 48.5% in the previous 36 months.  
This provides good evidence for the need for ‘parachute payments’ and 
arguably that these payments are insufficient.  The counter-argument is 
of course that clubs need to consider risk assessment more thoroughly 
and plan ahead for a possible relegation. 
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When a club is under pressure through actual relegation, it clearly leads 
to reduced gates and revenue streams from ticket sales, and reduced 
income from sponsorship and merchandising.  Clubs need to manage their 
costs very carefully in such circumstances.  There is clear evidence that 
outflows in respect of taxes and National Insurance payments are not 
always given the priority that they should be given. 
Of those cases where at least one debtor has been identified 87.5% 
involved one of the government tax agencies – either the Internal 
revenue and/or HM Customs and Excise prior to April 2005, or HM 
Revenue & Customs subsequently.   
57% of these cases of insolvency have occurred since September 2003 
when the government agencies lost their ‘preferred creditor’ status, 
compared to 43% in the period from 1986 to September 2003.  This 
represents a change from 0.065 per month to 0.143 per month.  This 
may be overstating the case as earlier data is less complete so far, but it 
would appear that HM Customs and Excise are now more likely to press 
for insolvency than their predecessors, who had a legal priority in the 
recovery of debts 
The timing of going into insolvency shows a very clear variation through 
the football season (see Figure 3).  Once the season starts in September, 
there is a small pre-Christmas peak in November.  Into the New Year 
there is a steady rise until a higher peak in May, which tails rapidly off to 
the least common month for insolvency, August. 
 
Fig. 3 Insolvencies by calendar month 
(rolling three-month average) 
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The form of insolvency chosen (or forced onto the club) shows interesting 
variation.  Liquidation is thankfully uncommon, occurring in only 11% of 
cases.  These are shown in Table 2.  All have since reformed, usually 
under new ownership and with new investment, and with varying degrees 
of success.  While Middlesbrough rapidly recovered, Hornchurch, 
Maidstone United and Scarborough lost any continuity with a reformed 
club.  Aldershot have very tortuously recovered over a fifteen-year period. 
Middlesbrough Tier 2 1986 
Aldershot Tier 4 1992 
Maidstone United Tier 4 1992 
Hornchurch Tier 6 2004 
Lancaster City Tier 6 2006 
Scarborough Tier 5 2007 2 
Table 2 Clubs liquidated  
 
Only three clubs are noted as having been placed into Administrative 
Receivership – Birmingham City in 1992, Luton Town in July 2003 and 
Derby County in October 2003.  All have subsequently ‘re-emerged’, 
although Luton Town was again placed in Administration in November 
2007. 
If there is a ‘normal’ pattern to insolvency, it is to be placed in 
Administration, to then progress to a Company Voluntary Arrangement 
(CVA), which should under legal provision be completed to the creditors’ 
satisfaction within five years.  The Football Association now requires clubs 
to proceed to a CVA.  Failure to do so results in a further 15 points 
deduction in addition to 10 points deduction for going into administration. 
The majority of clubs have come out of Administration within a year, but 
the period of CVAs has varied considerably.  Swindon Town spent a period 
of 74 months in Administration and then struggling to comply with the 
terms of their CVA. 
Full analysis of the variables identified on p.5 is not yet complete.  
However one of these, which looks like being another archetype, is worth 
reporting on at this stage, that is, incidences of alleged/proven criminal or 
irregular financial/management activity by directors and/or owners.  This 
behaviour is by no means confined to the world of football of course, with 
the Robert Maxwell and Conrad Black ‘empires’ being two high-profile 
examples.  At the time of writing the English football examples include: 
                                                 
2   While the other clubs listed went into liquidation very rapidly, the liquidation of 
Scarborough followed the club being placed in Administration some five years 
previously. 
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Boston United Ex-Chairman guilty of "conspiring to cheat the public revenue 
between 1997 and 2002".  Also charged with breaking FA rules; 
club docked 4 points 
Cambridge United Club forced to sell stadium to a company owned by one of the 
directors 
Darlington Ex-Chairman charged with personal financial offences 
Derby County Ongoing fraud cases against previous directors 
Doncaster Rovers Arson of the club’s stadium by the owner 
Hull City Six arrested in connection with an investigation into the 
financial affairs of club 
Luton Town  FA charges re payments to agents 
Swindon Town Ongoing legal dispute with former investor 
Wrexham Chairman attempted to get them evicted from their stadium so 
that he could sell it for development purposes.  Administrators 
managed to force return of ground to club. 
York City Chairman had moved ownership of stadium into a holding 
company.  Club ownership regained Jan 2005 
Although the issues listed vary in degree of seriousness and not all are 
proven, the fact that ten of the 56 insolvent clubs (17.9%) are listed does 
suggest that such issues are disproportionately correlated with 
insolvency.  More research is needed to gain a clearer picture. 
Similarly the variable of ‘stadium factors’ is leading to further in-depth 
research.  For 24 clubs (42.9%), their stadium was in some respect an 
issue surrounding their insolvency. 
As shown above in Table 1, clubs which have been relegated from Tier 1 
and carrying debts in excess of £30m are vulnerable to insolvency.  If the 
ex-Premier League clubs are excluded, typical debt levels of clubs going 
into insolvency are: 
Tier 2 £10m 
Tier 3 £3m 
Tier 4 £1m 
Tier 5 £1m 
Tier 6 £1m 
Clubs with current debts significantly above these levels, debts which 
therefore might be considered as ‘inappropriate’ (‘inappropriate’ in the 
sense that the debt level might be considered as unsustainable in the 
longer term on the basis of current revenues and costs), are clearly to be 
considered as being vulnerable to insolvency.  From the (inexhaustive) 
background research carried out, this would include those given in 
Table 3.  
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With the exception of Sheffield Wednesday, debts have since been 
restructured, but, unless the debts have actually been written off, the 
liability remains. 
Club 
Tier for 
2008/09 
Reported debt 
level 
Year of 
Report 
Cardiff City 2 £30m 2005 
Coventry City 2 £33m 2007 
Derby County 2 £44m 2006 
Leeds United 3 £35m 2007 
Leicester City 3 £35m 2003 
Sheffield Wednesday 2 £27m 2008 
Southampton 2 £20m 2006 
Table 3 Some clubs with ‘inappropriate debts’ 
In several cases the club appears to be dependent on a single benefactor 
‘bankrolling’ it.  The risk associated with this as a business model are only 
too evident when one considers the case of Gretna, liquidated in 2008 
while in the Scottish Premier League.  Some (English) Premier League 
clubs must be considered as at least potentially at risk for the same 
reason – Chelsea, for example, which is handsomely ‘bankrolled’ by 
Roman Abramovitch.  In February 2008 their annual loss was reported as 
£74,800,000, down only 7% on the previous season3.  The same report, 
on the BBC News website (BBC News, 2008), revealed that Abramovitch 
had invested in excess of £500m in the club since purchasing it in July 
2003.  Chief Executive Peter Kenyon, commenting on Chelsea’s high level 
of revenues, was quoted as saying “The numbers speak for themselves. 
All of our metrics are very positive.”  It can only be assumed that neither 
profit nor return on capital employed were included in those metrics. 
A very generalised picture of the slide into insolvency can be identified: 
• A trend of poor performance on the pitch leads to relegation and 
reduced revenues. 
• Costs are not cut back, in particular players’ wages, and are 
wrongly prioritised. 
• If the club owns its stadium, as the most valuable asset this 
becomes an issue.  If the club does not own its stadium, it raises 
different issues – borrowing becomes extremely difficult, but 
creditors may hold off as there is no major asset to strip. 
                                                 
3  Losses for 2004/05 had been as high as £140,000,000 (BBC News, 2006) 
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• Management faces a dilemma of whether to spend in the hope of 
improved performance on the pitch and hence promotion with its 
attendant financial gains, or whether to release its better players in 
order to reduce costs. 
• Bad management is widespread, with a worrying number of 
instances of unethical and even criminal management. 
The second phase of the research project will be completed by the 
analysis of variables not yet studied, continuing gathering of data, the 
vectoring in of hard financial data drawn from Companies House, and 
finally the identification of archetypes in order to proceed to Phase 3 and 
the in-depth interviews. 
 
PHASE 3 
Several problems in completing the final phase of the research have been 
identified and attempts made to overcome them through the research 
design.  This section outlines the problems and the steps taken in 
designing the research methodology in a way which should minimize their 
impact. 
Access 
It has been argued that “negotiating access to organizations for the 
purposes of research is a game of chance, not skill” (Buchanan, Boddy and 
McCalman, 1988, p.56).  While an element of chance is not disputed, it can 
reduced by the skill shown in contacting potential interviewees through 
networking, and the third author undoubtedly has contacts directly or 
through one link to many suitable interviewees. 
Reluctance to talk about failure 
Again, there may be a reluctance by potential interviewees when the topic 
for discussion is posed as ‘failure’, but it is assumed that there will be less 
reluctance when the topic is posed as a discussion on ‘battling to save the 
club’. 
Information aversiveness and Accuracy of memory 
The former is perhaps a symptom of management in the football sector, 
the latter a general difficulty faced when researching events in the recent 
past.  Furthermore (and here the world of banking, where one can 
compare the rescues of Johnson Matthey, Northern Rock, Bear Sterns and 
Bradford and Bingley) there are gains to speed, secrecy and a certain 
ruthlessness.  The fact that these gains accrue to all parties makes it hard 
to argue in favour of the openness and earnestness with which Northern 
Rock was treated.  The researchers will, in each case, have a set of data 
from contemporary sources with which to challenge memories if they 
seem to be drifting astray.   
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Persistence bias and Cognitive dissonance 
These two factors, the former leading too the latter, are anticipated.  
Again, the contemporary record of events, albeit incomplete, provides a 
benchmark against which the views expressed in interviews can assessed. 
Gagging clauses 
Because some of the interviewees may be ex-owners or ex-directors, it 
may mean that they are restrained by gagging clauses in the settlement 
contracts with which they left the clubs.  However, through networking, 
the researchers are confident that they will be able to find enough 
participants who will be willing and able to be interviewed.  Though not 
co-extensive with gagging, dealing with a company in trouble is a black 
art which can be extraordinarily lucrative for the receiver, who has no 
interest in de-mystifying the process for the common good or in raising 
his/her profile. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
As noted above, the European Commission recognises in principle that 
sport as business has a specificity, which may require a special legal 
status with respect to issues such as competition law and employment 
law.  This should not be seen as an excuse to abandon sound business 
practices in the football sector.  In the five seasons from 2001/02 to 
2005/06 the 92 clubs in the top four tiers of English football made an 
aggregated loss of £1,014,000,000 (developed from Hamil, 2007).  It 
may still be a beautiful game, but clearly is an ugly business. 
Already at this stage in the research project, it has become clear that, in 
this contemporary context, insolvency has become almost a ‘legitimate’ 
tactic in a football club’s business strategy.  This is supported by the 
sheer number of cases of it, especially in Tiers 2, 3 and 4.  The moves by 
both the Premier League and the Football League to penalise clubs for 
going into Administration or failing to negotiate a CVA can be interpreted 
as a move to de-legitimise this tactic. 
The high incidence level also suggests that becoming insolvent might be 
an emergent tactic rather than an intended tactic (Mintzberg, 1991) and 
the identification of the sector-specific factors associated with becoming 
insolvent is a very worthwhile exercise, with obvious practical 
applications. 
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APPENDIX 
 
TERMINOLOGY OF INSOLVENCY AND DEFINITION OF INSOLVENT 
CLUBS 
 
The term ‘insolvent’ is used when an individual or a company finds itself in financial 
difficulty.  This is likely to arise in one of three situations: 
• A developing situation, in which costs regularly exceed revenue and there are no 
longer sufficient assets to cover the difference; 
• A point-in-time situation, when repayment of a loan is due and there are not 
sufficient funds available to make the necessary repayment; 
• An asset or the assurance of support on which the person has been relying 
collapses in value, putting in jeopardy the willingness of others to sustain loans 
which in the normal course of event would have rolled on indefinitely. 
As creditors become anxious, a club, or indeed any company, may choose to follow one 
of three courses: 
1. Ignore the situation and press on regardless; 
2. Place itself in some form of voluntary administration – selling its assets to pay off 
its debts, and possibly ceasing to trade; 
3. Seek protection from the courts by going into Administration. 
It is very rare for a club to place itself into voluntary liquidation.  There is evidence that 
ignoring the situation is widespread in the football industry, but the focus of this 
research project is those clubs who choose the third option and seek court protection. 
Until 2003 there were two types of action that a court could take: 
• The appointment of an Administrator tasked with taking over the running of the 
club or business with a view to placing it on a firmer financial footing and 
ultimately rescuing it. In this situation, the company may not be wound up 
without the court’s permission.  The state of Administration thus offers both hope 
and protection to the insolvent club.  The appointment of an Administrator may 
be initiated by either the club or one or more of its creditors. 
• The appointment of an Administrative Receiver tasked primarily with the 
maximisation of debt recovery.  Debtors could seek the court appointment of an 
Administrative Receiver if they no longer felt that their debts were going to be 
serviced to their satisfaction. 
Since 2003 the appointment of an Administrative Receiver is no longer possible. 
In theory a club may simply come out of Administration if the Administrator manages so 
well that all debts are paid off in full.  This rarely happens.  There are two outcomes 
which are typical today: 
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• The Administrator finds a purchaser for the club.  The purchaser must reach 
agreement with the creditors, which usually means paying off an agreed 
percentage of debts in order to satisfy the creditors in full.  Where there are 
multiple creditors, this may result in lengthy and complex negotiation.  This 
process has also incurred suspicion if it took the form of ‘phoenixing’, whereby 
some or all of the former controllers of the firm create a new company that buys 
the business back from the administrators.  As this is what Her Majesty’s 
Government did in respect of Rolls Royce in the 1970’s, it’s not surprising that it 
this pattern is not uncommon.  The post-BMW Rover company, which actually 
took the name “Phoenix”, is the most high-profile example from recent years.  A 
measure of the complexity of these kind of affairs comes from the fact that as at 
November 2007, as reported by the BBC, “After two-and a-half years of digging 
the current cost (of the investigation into Phoenix and its subsequent collapse) is 
put at around £10.6m - and that figure is rising by £80,000 a week” (BBC Politics 
Show, 2007). 
• The Administrator negotiates a Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA) between 
the club and its creditors, an agreement which must be approved by the court.  A 
CVA will include a timetable for the repayment of debts, in part or full, and will 
allow the club to continue trading.  The day-to-day running of the club is passed 
back from the Administrator to the club directors.  A CVA is normally for a 
maximum period of five years. 
The Football Association now requires the establishment of a CVA as the progression out 
of Administration. 
Preferred creditors 
Under FA Rules, ‘football creditors’ have technically enjoyed the status of ‘preferred 
creditor’.  This means that, for example, if another club is owed money for the purchase 
of a player, that club has a higher claim on the insolvent club than for example, a 
supplier of meat pies.   
Until 2003 however, the Crown enjoyed the legal status of ‘preferred creditor’, meaning 
that it had a higher legal claim on a club’s assets than ‘football creditors’.  With the loss 
of that legal status, the Crown, typically as HM Revenue & Customs, the agency formed 
by the merger of HM Customs & Excise and the Inland Revenue, now has a lower claim 
on assets than ‘football creditors’ because of FA Rules. 
Creditors 
In broad terms our studies show that the hierarchy of creditors seeking money from an 
insolvent club are, in decreasing order of the size of debts: 
HM Revenue & Customs 
Banks and corporate investors 
Football creditors 
Suppliers 
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‘Near misses’ 
Clubs, or any company, may file a 10 day ‘notice of intent’ to apply to a court to go into 
Administration.  This may be a tactical move to pressure a putative new owner to make 
a quick and positive decision – once a club enters Administration it suffers an automatic 
deduction of 10 points in its league table.  In the case of Coventry City, for example, in 
December 2007 the club filed such a ‘notice of intent’ while negotiating with a potential 
new owner.  On the day on which the notice expired a takeover was agreed and 
Administration avoided by a matter of hours.  Such ‘near misses’ have not been logged 
as incidents of insolvency in the database, though we are going to look at one or two 
such examples to see if they shed light on the factors we are studying. 
Logging of incidents of insolvency 
For the purposes of this research a hierarchy of ‘wealth health’ is assumed for clubs: 
Solvent clubs 
Clubs operating under a CVA 
Clubs in Administration 
Clubs in Administrative Receivership 
Liquidated clubs 
Each step down this hierarchy is considered an incident and logged in the data table.  
This would typically be a club moving from solvency into Administration.  In a few 
instances the same club may be recorded as a second incident, e.g. if a club moves back 
from a CVA into Administration, or from Administration into Administrative Receivership. 
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